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Transfusion service disaster 
planning
K.l. Bundy, M.l. FOSS, and J.r. StuBBS
The Mayo Clinic, in Rochester, Minnesota, recently set forth 
a directive to develop a Mayo Emergency Incident Command 
System (MEICS) plan to respond to major disasters.  The MEICS 
plan that was developed interfaces with national response 
plans to ensure effective communication and coordination 
between our institution and local, state, and federal agencies 
to establish a common language and communication structure. 
The MEICS plan addresses multiple aspects of dealing with 
resource needs during a crisis, including the need for blood 
and transfusion medicine services.  The MEICS plan was devel-
oped to supplement our current local emergency preparedness 
procedures and provide a mechanism for responding to the 
escalating severity of an emergency to deal with situations of 
a magnitude that is outside the normal experience.  A plan 
was developed to interface the existing Transfusion Medicine 
disaster plan standard operating procedures (SOP) with the 
institutional and Department of Laboratory Medicine (DLMP) 
MEICS plans.  The first step in developing this interface was 
defining MEICS.  Other major steps were defining the chain 
of command, developing a method for visually indicating who 
is “in charge,” planning communication, defining the actions 
to be taken, assessing resource needs, developing flowcharts 
and updating SOPs, and developing a blood rationing team to 
deal with anticipated blood shortages.  Several key features of 
the interface and updated disaster plan that were developed 
are calling trees for response personnel, plans for relocating 
leadership to alternative command centers, and action sheets 
to assist with resource assessment.  The action sheets also 
provide documentation of key actions by response personnel. 
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Mayo Clinic Rochester identified the need to 
develop and implement an emergency response and 
command system that was both flexible and scalable 
to a variety of disasters and emergencies.  The need 
for flexibility and scalability in such a response plan 
is reflected in the Joint Commission’s revised emer-
gency management standard that has recently been 
implemented:
Effective January 1,2008, the emergency management 
standards (EC.4.10 and EC.4.20) for hospitals, critical access 
hospitals and long term care facilities have been revised to 
reflect an “all-hazards” approach to emergency preparedness 
that permits appropriately flexible and effective responses. 
The revised standards emphasize a “scalable” approach 
that can help manage the variety, intensity, and duration of 
the disasters that can affect a single organization, multiple 
organizations, or an entire community.  They also stress 
the importance of planning and testing response plans for 
emergencies during conditions when the local community 
cannot support the health care organization.  Over the past 
five years, the Joint Commission has studied a variety of 
disasters that impacted health care organizations, including 
floods, widespread electrical utility outages, the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, the four back-to-back Florida 
hurricanes of 2004, and the Katrina and Rita hurricanes 
that struck the Gulf Coast in 2005.  In formulating these 
standards changes, the Joint Commission was debriefed by 
health care organizations affected by these disasters, en-
gaged emergency management experts, served on national 
emergency management panels, and reviewed the current 
literature on emergency management.  From these studies, 
The Joint Commission concluded that it is not sufficient to 
require that health care organizations plan for a single event; 
they should be able to demonstrate sufficient flexibility to 
respond effectively to combinations of escalating events.1
At the 2007 AABB annual meeting in Anaheim, 
California, we briefly described the interface we de-
veloped between the Transfusion Medicine disaster 
plan and the institutional Mayo Emergency Incident 
Command System (MEICS) plan.2  In the following 
report, we detail further the MEICS plan that was 
developed to interface with national response plans 
to ensure effective communication and coordination 
between our institution and local, state, and federal 
agencies to establish a common language and com-
munication structure.  We also describe how we 
modified our existing Transfusion Medicine disaster 
plan SOP to integrate with the institutional MEICS 
plan while at the same time maintaining flexibility 
and scalability to deal with a variety of emergency 
and disaster responses.
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Methods
Defining the MEICS
The MEICS provides a standardized approach 
to managing emergency situations, internal crises, 
and external disasters.  MEICS employs a logical 
customized management structure, defined job 
responsibilities, clear reporting channels, and a 
common nomenclature to expedite decision making 
and help unify Mayo Clinic with other emergency 
responders.  MEICS is a leadership team, which is 
activated only when an emergent situation surpasses 
the normal operating capabilities of the institution 
or departments.  When MEICS is activated, new 
lines of authority are enacted, with all sections tak-
ing direction from the MEICS incident commander, 
either directly or via the MEICS section chiefs and 
unit leaders.
Following down the chain of command through 
the operations chief, the ancillary services director 
provides direction to all laboratory divisions through 
the laboratory unit leader.  Our challenge was to 
develop the interface between Transfusion Medicine 
and the laboratory unit leader so that the Transfusion 
Medicine disaster procedure could be modified to ac-
commodate institutional needs (Fig. 1).
Interfacing the Laboratory and Institutional MEICS
Multiple meetings were held with all divisions of 
Laboratory Medicine, including Transfusion Medicine, 
to define how to interface with the institutional MEICS 
plan and the laboratory unit leader.  The process that 
was developed has several key features that allow 
for flexibility, including the ability to relocate MEICS 
leaders away from their normal worksites.  Upon 
activation of the MEICS plan, the ancillary services 
director will assign one of the laboratory operations 
managers to serve as the laboratory unit leader.  If 
the laboratory unit leader needs to relocate to the 
Institutional Command Center, a second operations 
manager will be contacted and asked to serve as the 
onsite leader for the departmental laboratories, as 
shown in Figure 2.
Who’s in Charge?
MEICS leaders will don red vests to visually indi-
cate their responsibility for being “in charge” in the 
chain of command.  This visual indicator was felt 
to be important because the command structure of 
MEICS is different from the chain of command used 
in normal daily laboratory operations, with which 
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personnel have great familiarity.  For example, the 
Transfusion Medicine medical director who is “in 
charge” during normal operations will not be the de-
cision maker or information manager during a MEICS 
activation.  Management personnel in Transfusion 
Medicine will be visually reminded of this differ-
ence by the presence of the red vest.  One of the 
key lessons learned during the Katrina hurricane 
disaster was that there should be one single conduit 
through which all information and decisions flow to 
maintain command and control in emergency situa-
tions.  Poorly defined roles and control mechanisms 
were cited by the White House as major flaws in the 
response to Hurricane Katrina:
In terms of the management of the Federal response, 
our architecture of command and control mechanisms as 
well as our existing structure of plans did not serve us 
well.  Command centers in the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and elsewhere in the Federal government 
had unclear, and often overlapping, roles and responsibili-
ties that were exposed as flawed during this disaster.  The 
Secretary of Homeland Security is the President’s principal 
Federal official for domestic incident management, but he 
had difficulty coordinating the disparate activities of Federal 
departments and agencies.  The Secretary lacked real-time, 
accurate situational awareness of both the facts from the 
disaster area as well as the on-going response activities of 
the Federal, State, and local players.3
Institutional and Departmental Communication 
Planning
Once the MEICS plan has been initiated at Mayo 
Clinic, the laboratory unit leader will assess the situ-
ation and begin contacting the various laboratories in 
a tiered fashion, using a calling tree.  The calling tree 
is reviewed quarterly for accuracy.  Authorized users 
can obtain it by contacting the Mayo Clinic telephone 
operator.  Authorized individuals can also access the 
calling tree via a Web page.  The calling tree contains 
contact information for the various laboratory medi-
cal directors, operations managers, administrators, 
and departmental leadership.  The MEICS calling tree 
allows laboratory response personnel to be contacted 
in a tiered fashion based on likelihood of need.  For 
example, Transfusion Medicine is designated as a tier 
1 responding laboratory because of the high likeli-
hood of blood and blood products being required in 
mass-casualty emergencies.  In contrast, the likelihood 
of an immediate need for experimental pathology 
services during any sort of emergency is extremely 
low, resulting in a tier 4 designation for that depart-
ment.  The tiered approach to contacting personnel 
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Fig. 1. Mayo Emergency Incident Command System (MEICS) Management Structure
 MEICS uses a logical customized management structure to establish new lines of authority to provide a mechanism for responding to 
the escalating severity of an emergency to deal with situations of a magnitude that is outside Mayo Clinic’s normal experience.  An 
interface needed to be established between Transfusion Medicine and the laboratory unit leader.  The laboratory unit leader reports to the 
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also minimizes unnecessary responders placing 
undue burden on the response plan infrastructure 
and resources.  In case response personnel cannot 
be contacted, the calling tree also provides a pool 
of alternative contacts.  Lastly, the calling tree serves 
as a centralized source for up-to-date contact infor-
mation for response personnel, as shown in Figure 
3.  Phone lines may become overloaded during an 
emergency,and alternative means of communication 
may be necessary.  Text messaging has the advantage 
that it transmits at a lower bandwidth than a cell 
phone call.  The MEICS phone lines in the various 
command centers are dedicated lines with limited ac-
cess.  Alternatively, landline calls and wireless forms 
of communication can be prioritized by contacting 
the National Communication Systems.4  Mayo has re-
ceived Government Emergency Telecommunications 
Services (GETS) cards for use with MEICS.  These 
provide a priority rating on phone calls.  Two-way 
radios can also provide another means of commu-
nication outside of normal phone-based systems for 
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Fig. 2. Key Features of the Mayo Clinic Department of Laboratory Medicine and Pathology (DLMP) MEICS Process and Command 
Structure
 Key features of the DLMP MEICS process and command structure allow for flexibility of the laboratory unit leader to relocate to the 
institutional command center if needed.  The laboratory unit leader will contact another laboratory operations manager to serve as the 
onsite leader for the departmental laboratories if needed.
Taking Action during a Disaster and Assessing 
Resource Needs
Once the ancillary services director decides 
that the MEICS event is significant enough that the 
Department of Laboratory Medicine and Pathology 
(DLMP) will be affected, the ancillary services direc-
tor will contact the laboratory unit leader and ask 
that the DLMP MEICS plan be activated.  Action 
sheets were developed to assist the laboratory unit 
leader in documenting that key actions have taken 
place—those related to communications, establishing 
a chain of command, establishing a command center, 
and determining a variety of resource needs.  These 
resources include, but are not limited to, the need for 
blood, transportation, inventories of critical supplies 
and materials, personnel, schedules, food, lodging, 
and types of laboratory services that will be most 
needed.  The activities and resource need assess-
ments listed on the action sheets are prioritized into 
immediate, intermediate, and extended categories. 
The immediate actions include these:
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 1. Activating the calling tree and documenting who 
was contacted for each tier
 2. Establishing a DLMP command center (choose 
from 3 previously established sites that are 
stocked with emergency supplies, forms, and the 
red vest)
 3. Donning the red vest
 4. Establishing secretarial (scribe) support to do the 
following:
 a. Begin a journal of activities on a DLMP MEICS 
Log form
 b. Document needs, concerns, and decisions 
made
 c. Operate the tape recorder
 d. Establish a sign-in sheet for all leadership 
Fig. 3. MEICS Calling Tree (names and phone numbers removed)
 A summary diagram of the MEICS calling tree form that the laboratory unit leader uses to contact the operations managers once the ancillary 
services director has determined that laboratory services will be needed as part of the MEICS disaster response.  Operations mangers can 
then, in turn, contact their respective divisional medical directors and operations administrators.  The MEICS calling tree allows laboratory 
response personnel to be contacted in a tiered fashion based on likelihood of need.  This minimizes unnecessary responders placing undue 
burden on the response plan infrastructure and resources.  In case response personnel cannot be contacted, the calling tree also provides 
a pool of alternative contacts.  The calling tree serves as a centralized source for up-to-date contact information for response personnel and 
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reporting to the command center including, 
but not limited to, operations managers, 
divisional medical directors, and operations 
administrators.
 5. Reporting to the ancillary services director on the 
following:
 a. Blood inventory needs
 b. Critical equipment and supplies inventory 
needs
 c. Availability of laboratory staff (labor pool)
 6. Interacting with divisional laboratories and ser-
vices to do these:
 a. Communicate laboratory-specific needs
 b. Relay information to laboratories
 c. Establish frequency, time, and location of 
briefing meetings
The intermediate actions include these:
 1. Identifying whether phlebotomy services are 
needed
 2. Identifying whether pneumatic transport tube 
system is available
 3. Determining whether point-of-care testing is 
needed and if so doing these:
 a. Determine the type of testing needed
 b. Identify teams to travel to testing locations
 4. Delegating human resources, communications, 
and transportation
The extended actions include these:
 1. Establishing relief for leaders
 2. Developing a schedule for rotation of leadership
 3. Contacting the ancillary services director if any of 
these apply:
 a. Additional personnel are needed for staffing
 b. Family support is needed for staff
 c. Lodging is needed for staff
 d. Food and water are needed for staff
A second action sheet is used to capture informa-
tion related to the emergent situation.  Using this 
form the laboratory unit leader can capture this 
information:
 1. Leader’s name, for reference by other leaders
 2. Nature and magnitude of the incident, including 
the expected number of patients
 3. Expected duration of the incident
 4. Location of the incident
 5. Location of the Mayo Clinic command center
 6. Name and contact number of the person who no-
tified the laboratory unit leader of the emergent 
situation
 7. Date of the emergent situation
 8. Expected laboratory services needed
 9. Location of the DLMP command center
 10. Time the calling tree was activated
 11. Assessment of the blood inventory
 12. Assessment of any other laboratory services 
needed
 13. Any other pertinent notes
Specific Laboratory Actions and SOPs
The final portion of developing the overall MEICS 
plan was to establish laboratory-specific action items 
that could be written into standard operating pro-
cedures (SOPs) for each laboratory throughout the 
DLMP for reference by laboratory personnel.  In 
Transfusion Medicine we decided to incorporate the 
specific action items for MEICS activation into our al-
ready existing disaster plan procedure.  Much like the 
developers of the departmental plan, we developed 
an evaluation checklist for the operations managers 
to use to assess the emergency, record decisions, de-
fine the location of the command center, and capture 
relevant contact information.  The disaster evaluation 
checklist helps the operations manager capture the 
following:
 1. Evaluation of the need for additional personnel 
in each work unit
 2. Notification of outside blood donation testing 
laboratories and sample testing transportation 
providers
 3. Evaluation of the need for external source of 
blood if a large supply of blood components is 
anticipated, computers are not functioning, or 
both.  If the external source does not have an 
adequate supply, inquire about the possibility 
of them establishing a mobile site locally until 
Transfusion Medicine can resume collections
 4. Determination of whether blood collection, trans-
fusion, and processing should be discontinued 
for these:
 a. Therapeutic apheresis procedures (consider 
the need to disconnect piped-in oxygen)
K.l. Bundy et al.
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 b. Donor services (blood collection), including 
fixed and mobile sites
 c. Intraoperative autotransfusion services, list-
ing which hospital locations
 5. Relocation of specific work units, if required, and 
the new locations
 6. Relocation of blood inventory, and to where,with 
a specific list of locations that have the capabil-
ity for large, monitored, refrigerated storage 
capacity
 7. Any additional supplies that are needed: 
amount, source, date of receipt, lot number, and 
manufacturer
 8. Determination of whether or not a blood short-
age will occur and, if so, the upward communica-
tion from the Transfusion Medicine chair to the 
MEICS Blood RationingTeam
Transfusion Medicine Communication Planning
A Transfusion Medicine calling tree was devel-
oped to ensure timely notification of key response 
personnel.  However, unlike the DLMP MEICS calling 
tree, which uses a tiered approach, the Transfusion 
Medicine calling tree uses a time requirement notifi-
cation approach, indicating key contacts that should 
occur within the first 30 minutes, first hour, first 2 
hours, and first 4 hours, as shown in Figure 4.  We 
developed the time requirement approach to orga-
nizing our response plans in Transfusion Medicine to 
help us ensure that key decisions can be made about 
the potential for blood shortages.  Communication 
about the potential for blood shortages needs to 
flow back to the MEICS command personnel and 
the Blood Rationing Team so that timely decisions 
can be made about how the remaining blood supply 
should be used.  Likewise, decisions about public 
communication concerning the blood shortage must 
be made.
The Blood Rationing Team
To adequately respond to the need for blood or 
blood components subsequent to a natural disaster, 
terrorism, or internal crisis, a Blood Rationing Team 
was developed under MEICS.  Within the MEICS 
organizational structure, the team reports to the 
medical staff chief.  The development of a prescrip-
tive blood rationing plan was not feasible because 


















































Fig. 4. Transfusion Medicine Disaster Plan Calling Tree
 The Transfusion Medicine calling tree uses a time requirement approach to allow early notification of key emergency responders.  These 
key responders can quickly identify the potential for any anticipated blood shortages so that the MEICS blood rationing team can be 
notified, if necessary.
Transfusion service disaster planning
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Blood Rationing Team, consisting of internal experts, 
quickly assesses threats to the blood or blood com-
ponent supply; decides how quickly and completely 
the blood inventory can be “recovered” to adequate 
levels; and proposes solutions to limit or avoid a 
crisis that causes, or threatens to cause, inadequate 
patient care.  When activated, the Blood Rationing 
Team weighs the demands for blood or blood com-
ponents against the inventory.  The Blood Rationing 
Team triages demands and makes decisions to limit 
transfusions and elective surgical procedures as nec-
essary.  The Blood Rationing Team consists of chairs 
of each of the following: Transfusion Committee, 
Cardiac Surgery, Clinical Practice Committee, Ethics 
Committee, Hospital Practice Committee, Surgical 
Committee, Transfusion Medicine, Bone Marrow 
Transplantation, and Liver Transplantation.  The 
Emergency Blood Rationing Team is activated 
any time the chair of the Division of Transfusion 
Medicine (or designee) determines that the supply 
of blood or blood components is sufficiently low to 
threaten the ability to meet patient needs.  The chair 
of the Division of Transfusion Medicine (or designee) 
activates the Blood Rationing Team by requesting 
that the telephone operator notify team members of 
an emergency meeting, including time and location. 
The MEICS incident commander (or administrator on 
call) is also notified.
Transfusion Medicine Flowcharts and SOPs
Flowcharts for each work unit within Transfusion 














































































Fig. 5. A high-level summary diagram of how the specific pieces of the MEICS plan fit together to form a disaster response.  Additional actions are 
listed at the laboratory unit leader and Transfusion Medicine levels to help illustrate how key actions and communications flow within the 
process.
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the disaster plan SOP.  As in the calling tree, a time 
requirement approach was used to organize the key 
response steps in the flowcharts and to help identify 
in the early stages of the disaster any potential for 
blood shortages or the need to discontinue or in-
crease blood collections or services.  In addition, the 
time requirement approach used in the flowcharts 
and disaster plan procedure allows us to identify 
within the first hour of a disaster the need to contact 
our outside blood suppliers for additional support, 
the need to relocate laboratories and personnel, the 
need to call in additional personnel, and the possible 
need to activate the AABB disaster plan.5
Discussion
At the 2007 AABB annual meeting workshop 
on disaster planning, participants learned about the 
importance of planning for disaster management to 
maintain continuity of operations in various emer-
gency and disaster-related events.  Various speakers 
emphasized how most disasters are “managed at 
the local level.”  Organizations conducting disaster 
planning exercises need to develop interfaces and 
understand how they will interact with emergency 
responders at the local, state, and national levels when 
responding to the cycle of disaster management.6
With proper planning and consideration of 
the key factors important in managing the various 
aspects of disasters, organizations can mitigate un-
toward consequences that can prevent them from 
continuing vital operations such as maintaining a 
readily available blood supply.  We have been able 
to successfully develop a MEICS plan with several 
key features.  These include coordination with na-
tional and local response plans, generic flexibility to 
deal with multiple scenarios, an established chain of 
command, a list of key response personnel and their 
responsibilities, a process for contacting key response 
personnel using a calling tree, defined roles during 
a MEICS activation for each laboratory—including 
Transfusion Medicine—and action sheets to assist in 
resource analysis and decision making.  A high-level 
summary diagram of how the specific pieces of the 
plan flow together to form a disaster response is 
provided in Figure 5 to illustrate how information, 
communication, and some key actions might be 
handled, especially within Transfusion Medicine. 
Although the disaster response plan described here 
is specific to Mayo Clinic, the general key concepts, 
processes, and considerations of disaster planning, 
especially Transfusion Medicine response planning, 
can be applied by almost all major health care 
institutions.
Subsequent to the drafting of this manuscript, 
Mayo Clinic Rochester has adopted the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) under the 
Hospital Incident Command System (HICS).7  This has 
had no effect on the plans that have been described 
in this manuscript.  Mayo Clinic Rochester had previ-
ously been working towards NIMS compliance under 
the directives and guidance set forth by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency in September 2006 
as described in the NIMS Implementation Activities 
for Hospitals and Healthcare Systems document.
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